South African Legal Practice Council v Kgaphola and Another (795/2023) [2025] ZASCA 66 (23 May 2025)

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FLYNOTES: PROFESSION – Disciplinary proceedings – Practitioner’s response – LPC application for striking off or suspension – Attorney resorted to impugning integrity of LPC – Instead of addressing complaints against him – Making serious insinuations against professional regulatory body – Adopted unjustifiably combative and hostile attitude against LPC – Answering affidavit exhibiting worrisome lack of candour – Legal practitioners expected to co-operate and provide the necessary information – Broad denials and obstructionism have no place in these proceedings.

THE
SUPREME COURT OF APPEAL OF SOUTH AFRICA

JUDGMENT

Reportable

Case
no: 795/2023

In
the matter between:

SOUTH
AFRICAN LEGAL PRACTICE COUNCIL     
APPELLANT

and

KGETSEPE
REVENGE KGAPHOLA                         

FIRST RESPONDENT

KGAPHOLA
INCORPORATED

ATTORNEYS                                                               

SECOND RESPONDENT

Neutral
citation:   South African Legal Practice Council v
Kgaphola and Another (795/2023) [2025] ZASCA 66 (23 May 2025).

Coram:      
MAKGOKA, MOTHLE and MABINDLA-BOQWANA JJA and                

HENDRICKS and BAARTMAN AJJA

Heard:       
12 September 2024

Delivered: 
23 May 2025

Summary: 
Legal Practice – Legal Practice Act 28 of 2014 –
whether high court exercised its discretion judicially –
Professional misconduct – non-compliance with the
rules.

Professional
misconduct – Unjustifiably impugning the integrity of a
regulatory legal body without basis – in itself
a professional
misconduct.

Procedure
– application for postponement – whether satisfactory
explanation furnished for postponement.

ORDER

 

On
appeal from: Gauteng Division of the High Court, Pretoria
(Mngqibisa-Thusi J and Nqumse AJ, sitting as court of first
instance):

1 The
application for postponement is refused with costs, to be paid by the
first respondent on an attorney and client scale.

2 The
appeal is upheld with costs on attorney and client scale.

3 The order of the
Gauteng Division of the High Court, Pretoria is set aside and
replaced with the following:

‘1 The first
respondent, Mr Kgetsepe Revenge Kgaphola, is suspended from practice
as a legal practitioner for 12 months;

2 The period of
suspension referred to above is wholly suspended on condition that
the first respondent:

2.1 complies with rule
54.34 and rule 54.16 of the Legal Practice Council within 30 days of
this order;

2.2 does not contravene
section 84(1) of the Legal Practice Act 28 of 2014 during the period
of suspension;

2.3 is not found guilty
of a contravention of rule 3.1 of the Legal Practice Council’s
Code of Conduct during the period of suspension;

3 The first respondent is
ordered to pay the costs of this application on an attorney and
client scale.’

  

JUDGMENT

 

Makgoka
JA (Mothle and Mabindla-Boqwana JJA and Hendricks and Baartman AJJA
concurring):

[1] 
The
appellant, the South African Legal Practice Council (the LPC), is a
national
statutory body, established in terms of s 4 of the Legal Practice Act
(the LPA),[1] which, among
other things, regulates the conduct of all legal practitioners and
candidate legal practitioners in South Africa.
It appeals against
an order of the Gauteng Division of the High Court, Pretoria (the
high court).

 

[2]  The
high court dismissed the LPC’s application to remove the first
respondent, Mr Kgetsepe Revenge Kgaphola, from the roll
of attorneys,
alternatively to suspend him from practice. The high court ordered
each party to pay their own costs. It subsequently
granted the LPC
leave to appeal to this Court. Mr Kgaphola conducts practice under
the name Kgaphola
Incorporated Attorneys, the second respondent (the firm). For
convenience, I refer to Mr Kgaphola as ‘the respondent’.

 

Application
for postponement

[3]  At
the hearing of the appeal, the respondent sought the postponement of
the appeal, which the LPC opposed. We dismissed that application
with
costs on an attorney and client scale and undertook to furnish the
reasons for that order in this judgment. Below are the
reasons.

 

[4]  The
respondent failed to file his heads of argument in this Court. At the
hearing of the matter, counsel appeared on behalf of the
respondent
and applied for a postponement. The application for postponement was
made orally from the bar without a substantive
application. The basis
for the application was that the respondent wished to obtain the
transcribed record of oral submissions
in the high court.

 

[5]  Ordinarily,
the transcript of motion proceedings in the high court does not form
part of the record submitted to this Court. This
is stated in rule 8(6)(j)(i)
of the Rules of this Court, which provides that unless it is
essential for the determination of the appeal, and the parties
agree
thereto in writing, the record shall not contain argument and opening
address. Counsel submitted that
it would be apparent from the transcript that the LPC had conceded
that when the application was launched,
the respondent had complied
with the relevant LPC rules he is accused of breaching.

 

[6] 
It
is necessary for an applicant for a postponement to give a full and
satisfactory explanation of the circumstances that necessitate
a
postponement.[2] An application
for postponement should be sought as soon as a litigant realises the
need for it. It is self-explanatory that the
closer to the hearing
the application for postponement is made, the greater the risk of
prejudice to the other litigants involved
in the matter and
inconvenience to the court.

 

[7] 
As
this Court emphasised in McCarthy
Retail Ltd v Shortdistance Carriers CC:[3]

‘[A]
party opposing an application to postpone an appeal has a procedural
right that the appeal should proceed on the appointed day.
. .
Accordingly . . . an applicant for a postponement . . . must show a
‘‘good and strong reason’’ for
the grant of
such relief’.[4]

In
Lekolwane
and Another v Minister of Justice,^[5]
the
Constitutional Court explained:

‘The
postponement of a matter set down for hearing on a particular date
cannot be claimed as a right. An applicant for a postponement
seeks
an indulgence from the court. A postponement will not be granted,
unless this Court is satisfied that it is in the interests
of justice
to do so. In this respect the applicant must ordinarily show that
there is good cause for the postponement . .
.’[6]

 

[8]  In
the present case, there is no explanation why the respondent did not:
(a) avail himself of the provisions of rule 8(6)(j)(i)
by engaging with the LPC to obtain agreement in respect of the extent
of the record to be filed; (b) take steps to obtain the
transcript.
The LPC filed the appeal record on 25 October 2023 and its heads of
argument on 23 November 2023, with no objection
from the respondent.
As mentioned, the respondent did not file heads of argument.

 

[9]  Even
after all these events, there is no explanation why the respondent
took no steps to obtain the transcribed record between December
2023
and when this appeal was heard in September 2024. Apart from the fact
that the application for postponement lacked merit,
the respondent
also showed flagrant disregard for the rules of this Court, as
explained above. For these reasons, we marked our
displeasure by
dismissing the application with a punitive costs order on an attorney
and client scale. As counsel for the respondent
had no mandate to
argue the merits of the appeal, he was excused and the appeal
proceeded unopposed.

The
merits of the appeal

Factual
background

[10] 
The
respondent was admitted as an attorney on 28 August 2020. In October
2020, he opened a legal practice for his own account under
the firm’s
name and informed the LPC accordingly. On 8 October 2020, the LPC
confirmed the registration of the firm. It also
requested the
respondent to pay his membership fees; and furnish it with certain
information relating to the firm, including the
firm’s trust
banking details. The LPC informed the respondent that a fidelity fund
certificate would only be issued upon
receipt of the requested
information.[7] The respondent
neither responded to the LPC’s letter, nor furnished the LPC
with the requested information. As a result,
no fidelity fund
certificate was issued to him.

 

The
application in the high court

[11]  On
10 March 2021, the LPC launched an application in the high court for
removal of the respondent’s name from the roll of
attorneys,
alternatively, for his suspension. On 16 March 2021, the respondent
applied for, and was issued, a fidelity fund certificate.
However,
this certificate was withdrawn by the LPC on 30 April 2021, as a
result of the respondent’s failure to submit
the firm’s
opening auditor’s report to the LPC before 30 April 2021, as
required by the rules of the LPC. Despite this,
the respondent
continued practising as an attorney.

 

[12] 
In
its application, the LPC raised seven complaints against the
respondent. First, that he had practised as an attorney for the

periods 9 October 2020 to 31 December 2020 and 1 January 2021 to
15 March 2021, without being in possession of a fidelity
fund
certificate. Second, that he failed to notify the LPC of the firm’s
trust banking details. Third, that in contravention
of rule 54.34,
the respondent had opened the firm’s trust bank account in a
province where his main office is not based.[8]
Fourth, that he had failed to pay his annual membership fees for the
2020 financial year, due on 31 October 2020.

 

[13] 
Fifth,
that he had failed to register the firm with the Financial
Intelligence Centre, as required by s 43B of the Financial
Intelligence
Centre Act (FICA).[9]
Sixth, that he had failed to reply to correspondence. Seventh, that
he failed to register for a legal practice management course
approved
by the LPC’s council within the prescribed period.[10]
The completion of the course is a prerequisite for the issuing of a
fidelity fund certificate.[11]
The last complaint was not persisted with in this Court and will
therefore not be considered.

 

[14]  In
response, the respondent denied that he had practised without a
fidelity fund certificate. Instead, he averred that the application

had been served on him while he was attending to the requirements
necessary for him to be issued with a fidelity fund certificate.
As
regards the complaint that he had failed to furnish the LPC with his
trust banking details, the respondent denied the allegations
and
stated that ‘[the LPC] was furnished with all the required
documents’.

 

[15]  Regarding
the alleged non-compliance with rule 53.54 in respect of the firm’s
banking account, he contended that the LPC had
‘never queried
or noted that I did not open my Business and my Trust accounts within
the jurisdiction of my main office’.
The respondent admitted
that he had not paid the outstanding membership fee because ‘I
did not have it’. As
regards the complaint that he had failed to comply with the FICA
provisions, the respondent stated that he had registered and
provided
a FICA number to the LPC.

 

The
high court’s judgment

[16]  The
application came before the high court on 18 January 2022. The high
court delivered its judgment on 22 July 2022, concluding
that the LPC
had failed to establish the complaints that the respondent had
practised without a fidelity fund certificate, and
disrespected the
LPC in his response. It further held that the respondent’s
‘infractions
were not that serious to warrant a declaration that he is not fit and
proper to practise as an attorney and his removal
from the roll of
practising attorneys’.

 

[17]  The
high court said that the
respondent: (a) did not exhibit any dishonesty; (b) was young and
lacked experience; (c) was not inherently a dishonest person;
(d)
failed to pay his membership fees because he was indigent; and (e)
was not provided with guidance by the LPC. The high court
concluded
that attendance of a Practice Management Course would serve as a
corrective measure for the respondent. For these reasons,
the high
court dismissed the application and directed each party to pay its
own costs.

 

In
this Court

[18]  The
LPC is aggrieved by the order of the high court. It contended in this
Court that the high court misdirected itself in considering
the
complaints against the respondent. The LPC submitted that the high
court erred: (a) by not conducting a complete factual enquiry
to
determine whether the alleged misconduct had been established; (b) in
respect of those portions of the factual enquiry that
it conducted;
and (c) by failing to consider, cumulatively, the respondent’s
conduct.

 

The
enquiry

[19] 
The
proper approach to misconduct complaints against legal practitioners
is well-established and has been applied in many cases.[12]
It is a three-stage enquiry. First, a court determines whether the
complaint has been established on a balance of probabilities.
This is
a factual enquiry.  If established, the court enquires whether
the practitioner is fit to remain on the roll of legal
practitioners.
If he or she is not, the court must, in the third stage, determine a
sanction: whether the legal practitioner’s
name should be
removed from the roll or merely be suspended from practice for a
determinate period. In the second and third stages,
a court exercises
discretion.

 

[20] 
The
discretion exercised in the second and third legs of the enquiry is a
strict one.[13] Thus, a court
of appeal may only interfere if the discretion was not exercised
judicially.[14] This
means that a court of appeal is not entitled to interfere with the
exercise by the lower court of its discretion unless
it failed to
bring an unbiased judgment to bear on the issue; did not act for
substantial reasons; exercised its discretion capriciously,
or
exercised its discretion upon a wrong principle or as a result of a
material misdirection.[15]

 

The
high court’s treatment of the enquiry

[21]  After
setting out the contentions of the parties, the high court made the
following conclusions:

‘Taking
into account the evidence before me, as correctly submitted by
counsel for the first respondent, I am not convinced that
the
applicant has proven on a balance of probabilities that during 2020
the first respondent practiced as an attorney before he
was issued
with a Fidelity Fund Certificate. I am further not convinced that in
defending himself against the allegations made
by the applicant that
the first respondent had shown disrespect towards the applicant in
his response to the applicant’s
allegations. The first
respondent might have been tardy in his responses to the applicant
and/or might have used inelegant language.
However, the first
respondent’s conduct is not indicative of any intentional
disrespect towards the applicant.

 

I
am satisfied that the first respondent’s infractions were not
that serious to warrant a declaration that he is not fit and
proper
to practise as an attorney and his removal from the roll of
practising attorneys.’

 

[22]  It
is clear from the above passage that the high court misapplied the
three-stage enquiry by not properly conducting the first stage,
ie a
factual enquiry to determine whether the complaints against the
respondent had been established. Earlier, we set out the seven

complaints that the LPC placed before the court. None of them, except
that of practising without a fidelity fund certificate, was

investigated by the high court. It merely mentioned the complaints
and the respondent’s response to them, without deciding

whether, in respect of each, misconduct had been established on a
balance of probabilities.

 

[23]  It
is indeed not clear from the high court’s judgment whether it
was satisfied that any of the complaints had been established.
This
is because, while it did not expressly make the necessary factual
findings, the high court mentioned the respondent’s

‘infractions’, without indicating what those were.
Regarding the complaint about the fidelity fund certificate, the
high
court found that it had not been established on a balance of
probabilities. It reached this conclusion without any meaningful

discussion. As I indicate later, this conclusion is not borne out by
the common cause facts.

 

[24] 
Furthermore,
the high court considered irrelevant issues in arriving at its
conclusions. It said that: (a) the respondent was ‘young
and
inexperienced’; (b) the LPC did not ‘proffer him any
guidance’; and (c) his failure to pay his membership
fees was
because he was indigent. These were not issues relied on by the
respondent in his answering affidavit. It was therefore
not open to
the high court to factor them in as part of its reasoning. Both this
Court and the Constitutional Court have repeatedly
warned against
determining matters on issues that do not arise from the papers.[16]

 

[25] 
The
upshot of the above is that the high court materially misdirected
itself in the first stage of the enquiry. It follows that
the high
court based its conclusions in the second and third stages of the
enquiry on a flawed premise.  In the result, this
Court is at
large to set aside the high court’s factual findings and
consider the enquiry afresh.[17]
I do so next, considering in turn, the LPC’s complaints against
the respondent.

 

Whether
the complaints against the respondent were established: the first
enquiry

Practising
without a valid fidelity fund certificate

[26]  It
is undisputed that between 9 October 2020 and 16 March 2021, the
respondent did not have a valid fidelity fund certificate. His
answer
to this complaint is that he only commenced practice after being
issued with the fidelity fund certificate.  The respondent

misses the point. In terms of s 84(1) of the LPA, every attorney and
trust account advocate who practises or is deemed to practise
for his
or her own account is required to have a fidelity fund certificate.

 

[27]  The
fact is that the respondent opened the firm and a trust banking
account and informed the LPC accordingly. Once this occurred,
all the
consequences of an operative practice ensued. At the very least, he
was deemed to have been in practice, irrespective of
whether or not
he had clients during that period. He was only issued with a fidelity
fund certificate on 16 March 2021. That certificate
was withdrawn on
30 April 2021. Even though he was made aware of this withdrawal, the
respondent continued practising. The high
court should therefore have
found that the respondent had practised without a fidelity fund
certificate for the period 9 October
2020 to 16 March 2021, and
after 30 April 2021 when the certificate was withdrawn. This
complaint had thus been established.

 

FICA

[28] 
In
terms of s 43B of FICA, read with regulation 27A(3), the firm was
obliged to register with the Financial Intelligence Centre
(FIC)
within 90 days from the opening of the firm on 9 October 2020. Thus,
the respondent had until 7 January 2021 to register
the firm. Despite
being advised to do so by the LPC in October 2020, he failed to do
so. This is a contravention of rule 18.17
of the LPC’s Code of
Conduct.[18]

 

Failure
to immediately notify the LPC of Trust banking accounts

[29]  Section
86(1) of the LPA requires every attorney who practises for own
account to open and operate a trust banking account. Rule
54.16 of
the LPC rules requires every firm to immediately notify the LPC in
writing of the name and address of the bank at which
its trust
banking account is kept. The respondent opened the firm’s trust
bank account on 4 November 2020, but failed to
immediately notify the
LPC. His first attempt to do so was on 4 February 2021. But he sent
it to an incorrect email address. He
rectified this on 12 February
2021, when he used the LPC’s correct email address. There is no
explanation for the failure
to inform the LPC of the trust account
details immediately after the account was opened on 4 November 2020.
This complaint was
thus established.

 

Non-compliant
Trust bank account

[30]  Rule
54.34 of the LPC rules requires that a legal practice’s trust
account should be opened in the area of the Provincial
Council within
whose jurisdiction the firm’s main office is situated. The
firm’s main office is in Gauteng, under the
jurisdiction of the
Gauteng Provincial Council of the LPC. It is common cause that the
firm’s Trust bank account was opened
in Polokwane, Limpopo
Province, and not in Gauteng Province.  This is in contravention
of rule 54.34. The respondent’s
answer to this complaint is
that the LPC had not previously queried this.

 

Membership
fees

[31]  Rule
4 of the LPC rules prescribes the payment of annual membership fees
by legal practitioners to the LPC. The fees are payable
on or before
31 October annually. The respondent failed to pay his membership fees
for the year 2020 on or before the due date,
but only did so on 5
April 2021, after the application by the LPC was launched. The
respondent glibly stated that the reason he
did not pay the
membership fee on time was that he ‘did not have it’.
There is no further elaboration for this assertion.

 

Failure
to reply to correspondence

[32] 
It
is common cause that the respondent failed to respond to the letter
addressed to him by the LPC on 8 October 2020. This contravenes
rule
16.1, 16.2, 16.3 and 16.4 of the LPC Code of Conduct.[19]

 

Whether
the respondent is fit and proper to continue practice: the second
enquiry

[33]  The
sum total of the above is that the complaints against the respondent
have been established on a balance of probabilities. This
leads me to
the second enquiry. A
value judgment has to be made whether the respondent is a fit and
proper person to remain on the roll of attorneys. While some
of the
offences relate to inattentiveness and lack of application, two are
regarded as serious, ie practising without a fidelity
fund
certificate and failure to respond to correspondence.

 

[34] 
As
stated by this Court in Law
Society of the Northern Provinces v Mamatho,[20]
practising without a fidelity fund certificate is a serious
breach of an attorney’s duty and a criminal offence.
Regarding
failure to respond to correspondence, this Court, in Hewetson
v Law Society of the Free State,[21]
pointed out that this is a serious offence for which attorneys have
been struck off the roll, as it ‘not only speaks of a
lack of
courtesy, but constitutes a breach of professional integrity’.[22]

[35]  At
the time of launching the application in the high court, the
respondent had still not: (a) been issued with a fidelity fund
certificate; (b) paid his annual fees; and (c) rectified his banking
account by opening it in Gauteng in terms of rule 54.34. When
the
appeal was heard in this Court, all the issues had been resolved,
except compliance with rule 54.34. 

 

[36]  I
also consider the respondent’s conduct in the proceedings
before the high court. In his answer to the LPC’s application,

instead of addressing the complaints against him, the respondent
resorted to impugning the integrity of the LPC. For example, he

stated that the LPC: (a) brought the application well knowing that
its allegations were baseless; (b) was ‘clutching at straws’

to build a ‘non-existent case’; and (c) twisted the
facts.

 

[37] 
As
a result, said the respondent, he was perplexed about the motive
behind the application. As stated, all the complaints by the
LPC had
been established. The respondent’s allegations were clearly
intended to convey that the LPC had sinister motives
against him.
These are serious insinuations against a professional regulatory body
whose function is, among others, to maintain
ethical standards. They
should not be lightly made. In Law
Society of the Northern Provinces v Mogami (Mogami),[23]
this Court warned against such conduct and pointed out that this, in
itself, constitutes unprofessional conduct and a strategy
that the
courts cannot countenance.

 

[38]  It
behoves us to repeat that warning here. A time will soon arrive when
legal practitioners who make themselves guilty of this unprofessional

conduct risk being suspended from practice or struck off the roll,
solely based on this, as this may be indicative of, or border
on,
lack of fitness to practise as a legal practitioner.    

 

[39]  The
respondent’s attitude is troubling, particularly because he is
a new entrant into the profession. His real first encounter
with the
LPC has been characterised by his failure to comply with his
professional obligations. What is more, the respondent has
adopted an
unjustifiably combative and hostile attitude against the LPC. His
answering affidavit exhibits a worrisome lack of candour.

 

[40] 
The
respondent’s conduct necessitates that the following trite
principles be restated. Proceedings
such as the present are of their own kind and of a disciplinary
nature. They are neither criminal nor civil proceedings
between the
LPC and a respondent legal practitioner. The LPC, as a repository of
professional norms, places facts before the court
for consideration
for it to exercise its discretion upon those facts.^[24]
It
is, therefore, expected of legal practitioners against whom
allegations of impropriety are made, to co-operate and provide the

necessary information, and to place the full facts before the Court
to enable it to make a correct decision. Broad denials and

obstructionism, as we have seen in the present case, have no place in
these proceedings.^[25]

 

[41]  As
mentioned, the respondent has made himself guilty by practising
without a fidelity fund certificate and failing to respond to
the
LPC’s correspondence – two serious offences. Each one on
its own attracts suspension or striking off. He, however,
rectified
the situation in respect of the fidelity fund certificate, and had
been issued with one when the application was heard
in the high
court. Regard being had to a conspectus of the facts, I conclude that
although the respondent is guilty of unprofessional
conduct, that
does not render him unfit
to continue to practise as an attorney.

 

The
sanction: the third enquiry

[42] 
The
finding that the respondent is not unfit to continue to practice is
not
the
end of the enquiry. As
this Court explained in Malan
v Law Society of the Northern Provinces (Malan):[26]

‘As
far as the second leg of the inquiry is concerned, it is well to
remember that the Act contemplates that where an attorney is
guilty
of unprofessional or dishonourable or unworthy conduct different
consequences may follow. The nature of the conduct may
be such that
it establishes that the person is not a fit and proper person to
continue to practise. In other instances, the conduct
may not be that
serious and a law society may exercise its disciplinary powers,
particularly by imposing a fine or reprimanding
the attorney (s
72(2)(a)).
This
does not, however, mean that a court is powerless if it finds the
attorney guilty of unprofessional conduct where such conduct
does not
make him unfit to continue to practise as an attorney. In such an
event the court may discipline the attorney by suspending
him from
practice with or without conditions or by reprimanding him . . .’[27]
(Emphasis added.)

 

[43]  This
Court is therefore entitled to discipline the respondent for his
misconduct, despite finding that he is not unfit to continue

practice. The sanction imposed for his unprofessional conduct should
reflect the seriousness of his conduct, and address the outstanding

issue to ensure compliance. I consider that a suspension for a
period, which is wholly suspended on certain conditions, would be
an
appropriate sanction. The LPC has suggested a period of suspension
for 18 months. In the circumstances of the case, I deem 12
months to
be appropriate.

 

Costs

[44] 
 The
LPC had a statutory duty to approach the court. As stated, when the
application was launched, all the complaints against the
respondent
were live issues, including the serious one of practising without a
fidelity fund certificate. The LPC was therefore
entitled to approach
the court to protect the public. It did not do so as an ordinary
litigant. Although the high court found that
the respondent had
transgressed professional rules, it ordered each party to pay its own
costs. This is an unusual order in matters
of this nature, as this
Court remarked in Mogami.[28]
 

 

[45] 
The
general rule is that the LPC is entitled to its costs on an attorney
and client scale, even if unsuccessful.[29]
The high court paid no regard to these principles. To that extent, it
did not exercise its discretion judicially. The respondent
should
have been ordered to pay the costs on an attorney and client scale. A
similar order should follow in this Court.

 

[46]  In
the result, the following order is made:

1 The
application for postponement is refused with costs, to be paid by the
first respondent on an attorney and scale.

2
The appeal is upheld with costs on attorney and
client scale.

3
The order of the Gauteng Division of the High
Court, Pretoria is set aside and replaced with the following:

‘1 The first
respondent, Mr Kgetsepe Revenge Kgaphola, is suspended from practice
as a legal practitioner for 12 months;

2 The period of
suspension referred to above is wholly suspended on condition that
the first respondent:

2.1 complies with rule
54.34 and rule 54.16 of Legal Practice Council within 30 days of this
order;

2.2 does not contravene
section 84(1) of the Legal Practice Act 28 of 2014 during the period
of suspension;

2.3 is not found guilty
of a contravention of rule 3.1 of the Legal Practice Council’s
Code of Conduct during the period of suspension;

3 The first respondent is
ordered to pay the costs of this application on an attorney and
client scale.’

 

T
M MAKGOKA

 JUDGE
OF APPEAL

 

Appearances

For
appellant:              
R M Stocker

Instructed
by:               
Rooth & Wessels Inc.,
Pretoria

                                     

Pieter Skein Attorneys,
Bloemfontein

 

For
respondents:          
S C Bereng (only for the postponement application)

Instructed
by:                
Maladzhi & Sibuyi
Attorneys Inc., Pretoria

                                      

Masia Attorneys Inc.,
Bloemfontein.

 

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