Langa v Minister of Correctional Services (2025/030684) [2025] ZAGPPHC 513 (26 May 2025)

IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA

(GAUTENG DIVISION,
PRETORIA)

Case no: 2025-030684

In the matter between:

MANKOPANE
STEPHEN LANGA                                            

First to

AND
19
OTHERS                                                                      

Twentieth Applicants

and

MINISTER
OF CORRECTIONAL SERVICES                           

First Respondent

CHAIRPERSON,
PAROLE BOARD, LEEUWKOP                   
Second Respondent

NATIONAL
COUNCIL FOR CORRECTIONAL SERVICES      
Third Respondent

Summary

Save in exceptional
circumstances, it is not appropriate to remove a lay litigant’s
application from the urgent roll. Every
effort must be made to
ascertain the nature of the complaint. If the complaint is urgent, it
must be dealt with fairly on its merits.
If it is not urgent, it must
be struck from the roll. If, in truly exceptional circumstances, a
removal is appropriate, reasons
for that order should be given,
whether in the order itself, or in a short judgment.

JUDGMENT

WILSON
J:

1
  The applicants are twenty
individuals serving life sentences at the Leeuwkop Prison. They
brought an application before me in my
urgent court on 20 May 2025.
The application papers are not easy to decipher, but the essence of
the applicants’ complaint,
which was related to me by the first
applicant, Mr. Langa, became clear enough after a few minutes of
close questioning through
an interpreter. The complaint is that the
applicants have completed the non-parole period of their sentences,
but are being denied
the opportunity to apply for parole.

2 
Mr. Langa’s appearance before me was apparently his
third in six weeks. The application has twice been removed from the
urgent
roll. I do not know what led to these removals, but it seems
to me that a court should be slow to remove from the urgent roll an

application brought in person without a full appreciation of the
nature of the complaint advanced.

3
  The proper course, in all
but exceptional cases, is to ascertain the nature of the complaint,
take a view as to its urgency, and
then deal with it on the merits or
strike it off the roll, so that it can be dealt with in the ordinary
course. A simple removal
generally achieves nothing. It is no more
than an encouragement to a lay litigant to re-enrol the matter in the
next urgent court,
making their case part of the next urgent Judge’s
burden. Where a matter is removed rather than struck from the roll
for
good reason, the Judge removing the matter should generally
record their reasons in their order, or in a short judgment given, if

necessary, ex tempore.

4
  Where the litigant in
person is incarcerated, this general approach must admit of very few
exceptions, because the complaint will
almost inevitably concern a
claim for release or a claim about the conditions of the applicant’s
incarceration. Whether or
not the complaint turns out to have any
merit, claims of this nature generally require the most serious and
anxious consideration,
because the person advancing them, being
incarcerated, is inherently vulnerable, and the nature of the
complaint relates either
to an asserted right to liberation, or to
the conditions of the applicant’s detention. This court has
wide powers, both under
the common law and under the Constitution,
1996 to inquire into the basis on which, and circumstances in which,
any person within
its jurisdiction is detained, and to grant just and
equitable relief to remedy any breach of rights that becomes evident
from that
inquiry (see, for example, Principal Immigration Officer
v Narayansamy, 1916 TPD 274 at 276; Ganyile v Minister of
Police 1962 (1) SA 647 (E) at 654 and Arse v Minister of Home
Affairs 2012 (4) SA 544 (SCA) at paragraphs 5 and 10, read
together with sections 12, 38 and 172 of the Constitution).

5
  Once the nature of the
complaint has been established, it is necessary to hear from the
authorities responsible for the applicant’s
detention. In this
case, that was impossible, because there was no appearance for the
first respondent, the Minister of Correctional
Services. Without
input from the Minister, it is impossible to determine whether Mr.
Langa has correctly identified the applicants’
complaint and
whether that complaint has any merit.

6
  To the extent that the
state of the applicants’ papers might have led the State
Attorney to believe that the application was
not worth defending,
that was a mistake. Where an incarcerated individual complains about
the lawfulness of their detention, or
the conditions in which they
are being kept, it is incumbent upon the Minister and his legal
representatives to take the complaint
seriously, even if, in their
view, it has no merit. The State Attorney is furthermore obliged to
make representation available
to the Minister, so that the Minister’s
interests are properly protected and the court is informed of the
Minister’s
views.

7
  In this case, none of that
happened, which was unfortunate.

8
  A further problem was the
Department of Correctional Services’ failure or refusal to
ensure that all the applicants capable
of doing so could attend court
to advance their case. The Department could have been in no doubt
about who the applicants are.
They are listed at 46-2 of the
Caselines entry for this matter, together with their inmate numbers.
The fifth applicant, a Mr.
Mngomezulu, has died since the matter was
instituted, which obviously explains his non-appearance. But I have
no idea why the rest
of the applicants were not brought to court.
That requires an explanation.

9
  I would not normally
regard a case of this nature as urgent, but it would not be
appropriate to strike it from the roll. The practice
in this court is
generally to case manage matters brought by incarcerated individuals,
the claims made by Mr. Langa require further
investigation, and the
way the case has been shunted from one urgent court to another over
the past month is inherently unsatisfactory.
These facts call for a
bespoke approach. I will accordingly make an order placing this
matter under my supervision, and directing
inquiries to the relevant
departments, with the aim of resolving the applicants’
complaints expeditiously.

10
  For all these reasons –

10.1   The
application is postponed sine die.

10.2   The first
respondent is directed, by no later than noon on Friday 6 June 2025,
to file a report, made under oath by
an official with personal
knowledge of the relevant facts, setting out the following –

10.2.1   The
offences of which each of the applicants was convicted;

10.2.2   The date on
which each of the applicants was sentenced, and the sentence imposed;

10.2.3   The date on
which it is contended that each of the applicants qualifies to be
considered for parole under the applicable
law;

10.2.4   If any of
the applicants currently qualifies to be considered for parole, the
steps that have been taken and will
in future  be taken to
assess their suitability for parole, and the dates on which future
steps, if necessary, will be taken;
and

10.2.5   An
explanation for the Minister’s failure to produce the
applicants before Wilson J on Tuesday 20 May 2025.

10.3   The registrar
of this court is directed forthwith to draw a copy of this judgment
and order to the attention of the
head of the State Attorney’s
Johannesburg and Pretoria offices.

10.4   The
application will thereafter be case managed by Wilson J, and may be
re-enrolled with the presiding Judge’s
consent, for such
further relief as may then be appropriate.

10.5   The question
of costs is reserved.

S
D J WILSON

Judge
of the High Court

This
judgment is handed down electronically by circulation to the parties
or their legal representatives by email, by uploading
it to the
electronic file of this matter on Caselines, and by publication of
the judgment to the South African Legal Information
Institute. The
date for hand-down is deemed to be 26 May 2025.

HEARD
ON:                            

20 May 2025

DECIDED
ON:                         

26 May 2025

For
the First Applicant:             
In person