Mabaza v Road Accident Fund (29534/2012) [2025] ZAGPJHC 519 (30 May 2025)

IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA

GAUTENG
LOCAL DIVISION, JOHANNESBURG

Case
No: 29534/2012

(1) 
REPORTABLE: YES
/ NO

(2) 
OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: YES
/ NO

(3) 
REVISED: YES
/
NO

30 MAY 2025

In
the matter between:

JOHN RESIMATI
MABAZA                                                                 

Plaintiff

and

ROAD ACCIDENT
FUND                                                                    

Defendant

JUDGMENT

WINDELL
J

[1] On 13 May 2025, I
granted an order in favour of the Plaintiff, Mr Mabaza, in the
absence of the Defendant, the Road Accident
Fund. The order was made
in the following terms:

(a) The Plaintiff’s claim
herein was timeously lodged and has not become prescribed;

(b) The Defendant’s
Special Plea of extinctive prescription is dismissed with costs; (c)
The Defendant to pay the Plaintiff’s costs
as between party-and-party
on the High Court Scale which costs shall include the full fee (“day
fee”) of Plaintiff’s
counsel, Adv MCC de Klerk, briefed for
trial on 13 May 2025, as on a Scale B. as well as his preparation for
trial and preparation
and drafting of heads of argument.

These are the reasons for
that order.

[3] The Plaintiff’s
claim arises from injuries sustained in a motor vehicle accident
which occurred on 15 August 2008 on the
R23 Road between Balfour and
Heidelberg. The Plaintiff was a passenger in a white Nissan 1400 when
the driver lost control of the
vehicle, resulting in a collision.

[4] The claim falls under
the Road Accident Fund Act 56 of 1996, as amended by the Road
Accident Fund Amendment Act 19 of 2005 (‘the Act’), which
came into operation on 1 August 2008.

[5] The Defendant raised
a Special Plea of extinctive prescription, contending that the
Plaintiff had failed to lodge his claim
within the three-year period
prescribed in section 23(1) of the Act, read with sections 17(1) and
24 thereof.

[6] In response, the
Plaintiff filed a replication denying that his claim had prescribed.
He acknowledged the three-year prescription
period but pointed out
that, because the final day of that period—14 August 2011—fell
on a Sunday, the period was effectively
extended to the next working
day, 15 August 2011.

[7] The concept of
prescription is well established. A debt is extinguished once the
prescriptive period has lapsed, unless revived
through a new
undertaking. Courts may not raise prescription mero motu; it must be
pleaded as a special plea. The party relying
on prescription bears
the onus of proving when it began to run.

[8] Section 23(1) of the
Act states that the right to claim compensation shall prescribe three
years after the cause of action arose.
When calculating prescription,
the civilian method is used: the first day is included and the last
day excluded (FILO). In this
case, that would ordinarily be 14 August
2011.

[10]
Traditionally, prescription would expire even if the final day fell
on a Sunday. This approach changed with the judgment in
Road
Accident Fund v Masindi,[1]
where the Court held that, if the last day for bringing a claim falls
on a day when court offices are closed, prescription is extended
to
the next working day. To do otherwise, the Court held, would create
an absurd and unjust result.

[11]
This principle was extended in Gabuza
v Road Accident Fund.[2]
There, van der Schyff AJ held that the Masindi
principle
applies not only to public holidays but also to Sundays and other
dies non. The Court found that the period of prescription
must be
interpreted to protect the claimant’s right to access the courts.

[12] It is trite that the
Road Accident Fund substitutes the delictual wrongdoer and creates a
statutory claim that must be lodged
within three years, failing which
it prescribes. However, this interpretation must align with
constitutional principles and the
objects of the Act, namely to
provide the widest protection to those injured through the negligent
driving of motor vehicles.

[13] Applying the Masindi
and Gabuza principles to the present facts, the Plaintiff’s
claim—lodged on 15 August 2011—was not out of time. The
final
day for lodging the claim, 14 August 2011, fell on a Sunday.
The Plaintiff was thus entitled to lodge his claim on the next court

day, 15 August 2011.

[14] This approach is
supported by Section 34 of the Constitution, which guarantees the
right to have legal disputes determined
in a fair public hearing. The
interpretation advanced by the Defendant ignores this imperative and
would undermine the protective
purpose of the legislation.

[15] Accordingly, the
Plaintiff’s claim was not prescribed. The Defendant’s
Special Plea of extinctive prescription
is thus dismissed with costs,
including the qualifying and appearance fees of Plaintiff’s
counsel.

L.
WINDELL

JUDGE
OF THE HIGH COURT

GAUTENG
LOCAL DIVISION, JOHANNESBURG

Delivered: 
This judgement was prepared and authored by the Judge whose name is
reflected and is handed down electronically
by circulation to the
Parties/their legal representatives by email and by uploading it to
the electronic file of this matter on
CaseLines.  The date for
hand-down is deemed to be 30 May 2025.

APPEARANCES

For
the applicant:                              

Mr M.C.C. De Klerk

Instructed
by:                                     

Maluleke ZD Attorneys C/O Gert Nel

Incorporated

For
the respondent:                            

No appearance

Date
of hearing:                                  

13 May 2025

Date
of judgment:                               

30 May 2025